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Abstract 
We study the market for teachers in England, in particular teacher turnover. We show that there is a 
positive raw association between the level of school disadvantage and the turnover rate of its 
teachers. This association diminishes as we control for school, pupil and local teacher labour market 
characteristics, but is not eliminated. The remaining association is largely accounted for by teacher 
characteristics, with the poorer schools hiring much younger teachers on average. We interpret this 
market equilibrium allocation as either deriving from the preferences of young teachers, or as 
reflecting the low market attractiveness of disadvantaged schools. 
Keywords:  teacher labour market, teacher turnover, disadvantaged schools, educational 
inequality 
JEL Codes: I20 
Thanks to the ESRC for funding this research through CMPO. Thanks also to the Department for 
Education for providing the data: the School Workforce Census and the National Pupil Database.  We 
are very grateful to Susanna Loeb for comments on an early draft of this paper, to seminar 
participants at CMPO, and to the Editor and referees for comments. 
2 
 
1. Introduction 
 
It is now well established that teacher effectiveness is central to good pupil progress in school1. 
Policies to improve overall teacher effectiveness and reduce educational inequality are hampered by 
a lack of understanding of the teacher labour market. While the ‘macro’ movements into and out of 
the profession as a whole are well researched in the UK, we know very little about the ‘micro’ 
movements into and out of schools. This matters for a number of reasons. First, it is school-level 
separations and engagements that schools see and react to; it may have implications for wages if 
schools pay more to attract staff, and for teacher workload if a school is over-stretched. Second, the 
balance of short and long tenures among teachers may affect the production function, including the 
possibility of lower attainment if pupils face a constant churn of their teachers (see for example, 
Ronfeldt et al 2011). Research on this issue has simply not been possible on a large-scale 
representative basis due to a lack of data. Specifically, we address the view that teacher turnover is a 
particular problem for disadvantaged urban schools.  It is argued that greater turnover coupled with 
the lower effectiveness of novice teachers might explain part of the substantial test score difference 
between schools in deprived and more affluent neighbourhoods. In fact, there is very little UK 
evidence on this issue2, rather more from the US that we briefly review below. Understanding the 
test score gap between disadvantaged pupils and the rest is a leading policy concern, contributing to 
low social mobility, so the potential role of teacher turnover is important.  
In this paper we contribute to this evidence base by analysing teacher turnover across schools. We 
compute the distribution of job tenure3 in each school, both the fraction of teachers who have been 
at the school for ten years or more, and the fraction only just hired. We first describe the 
distribution of job tenure for teachers. We then establish the nature and magnitude of the 
differential turnover between schools. We show that there are systematic differences in turnover: 
schools with many poor pupils do have more short-tenure teachers and fewer experienced teachers. 
However, on average the differences are small: 18% (22%) of teachers in the least (most) 
disadvantaged schools have tenure of 0-2 years, while 20% (17%) have tenure of over 10 years. We 
also use the richness of the data to decompose the relationship between turnover and poverty. We 
show that part can be accounted for by pupil characteristics, perhaps because students in schools in 
more deprived areas are harder to teach.  
                                                          
1 See for example Rockoff (2004), and Slater et al (2012) for England and Burgess (2016) for a summary.  
2 See for example Dolton and Newson (2003) and Smithers and Robinson (2004) 
3 Tenure here means time in a particular school, not time in the teaching profession as a whole. 
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One particular focus of our analysis is spatial differences in the local teacher labour market around 
each school. These are likely to be important for turnover as there are clearly major differences in 
market density and hence job offer rates in urban and rural areas. The recent release of a new 
administrative dataset on teachers by the UK Department for Education offers great promise, and 
the fact that the data is a census of teachers means that we can model all the schools around a focus 
school, and so the overall local labour market conditions facing a teacher. Neighbourhood poverty is 
correlated with urban density, so we are able to show that local labour market conditions also 
explain part of the overall correlation between turnover and disadvantage. 
The remaining association is largely accounted for by teacher characteristics, with the schools in 
disadvantaged communities hiring much younger teachers on average. We interpret this market 
equilibrium allocation as either deriving from the preferences of young teachers, or as reflecting the 
low market attractiveness of disadvantaged schools. Teachers are not randomly assigned to schools 
but are hired through a search and matching process. While the relationships we estimate cannot be 
given a watertight causal interpretation, our results have an IV interpretation and we see the results 
here as providing the first detailed description of teacher turnover in England.  
Research on teacher turnover in the UK has been hampered by the lack of data, and a consequently 
greater reliance on turnover intentions than might otherwise be desirable. The literature has also 
used different concepts in addition to the separation rate with a focus on the ‘wastage’ rate, i.e. the 
fraction of teachers leaving the profession entirely.  
The available evidence suggests an association between higher turnover and schools serving 
disadvantaged students, although the evidence base is not extensive in England. Dolton and Newson 
(2003) find that 10% more students eligible for free-school meals (FSM) is associated with 1% higher 
teacher turnover. The teacher labour market is different in many ways between England and the US, 
not least that schools are the employer in England as opposed to school districts in the US, and 
school pay is correlated with school context in the US but not in the UK. Nevertheless, given the 
paucity of UK evidence, a brief review of US evidence is useful. Boyd et al (2011) use NYC 
administrative data on the applications-to-transfer for the years 2006-07 and 2007-08 and finds that 
schools with higher proportions of Black, Hispanic, low-income and low-achieving students receive 
about 40% fewer applicants to them and about 40% more away from them. Similarly Ronfeldt et al 
(2011) find that schools with least turnover have more high-achieving and Asian students, fewer 
poor, Black and Hispanic students, and fewer student absences and suspensions. Hanushek, Kain and 
Rivkin (2004) find that almost 20% of teachers in the bottom quartile of schools, ranked by student 
achievement, leave each year as opposed to 15% in the top quartile schools.  Boyd et al (2008) show 
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that among first-year teachers, the less effective (based on a value-added estimate) are more likely 
to leave, though this correlation disappears in the subsequent few years. Loeb et al (2011) study the 
hiring, deployment and retention of effective teachers and find that effective schools are better able 
to retain effective teachers.  Interestingly, Falch and Ronning (2005) find the opposite correlation 
between turnover and disadvantage in Norwegian schools. 
Section 2 sets out the statistical and economic framework we use to interpret the results, and 
section 3 describes the data. Section 4 establishes the nature of the relationship between 
disadvantage and turnover, and section 5 analyses the source of that association. Finally, section 6 
summarises the results and estimates the impact of the higher turnover on school performance. 
2. Economic and statistical modelling of the tenure distribution  
a. Theoretical framework 
We first discuss individual behaviour and then market equilibrium. Total separations from a school 
combine quits, retirements and layoffs. In fact, very few teachers are dismissed in England, so we 
ignore that. Retirements obviously do happen and will form part of the separations at older ages, 
but the emphasis here is on quits. Teachers can leave their current school to work in another school, 
in another job outside teaching or to leave the labour force altogether. Standard models of quits 
emphasise wage offers, promotion or wage growth prospects, and non-pecuniary aspects of a job. In 
teaching, although wage schedules are very important, there is still important variation in pay for 
teachers with the same role, age4 and qualifications, albeit much less than in the private sector. The 
SD of pay relative to mean pay for teachers5 who are aged 23-25 is 0.153; 0.189 for those aged 33-
35, 0.210 for those 43-45, and 0.160 for those aged 53-55. Wage growth and promotion prospects 
also vary, particularly with school size. Non-pecuniary aspects of different schools are likely to be 
very important given the relative fixity of public sector pay scales compared to private sector 
employers. These will include the characteristics of the students, and the general “teach-ability” of 
the student body; the resources available to the school, for example the provision of IT and the 
availability of teaching assistants; and the ethos and management of the school. Some of these 
factors may only become apparent after starting in the job, but many including the level of 
disadvantage will be very evident at the job interview.  
                                                          
4 We can only approximate total teaching experience as we do not know the date of the first teaching job. 
5 These are statistics for full-time, secondary school, classroom teachers holding a degree. 
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Teachers are not distributed at random across schools of differing degrees of disadvantage, so it is 
not possible to give the findings we present below a strong causal interpretation. Specific types of 
teachers are hired into specific types of school, and their subsequent separation decisions are part of 
the expected outcome at the point of hiring. So to interpret our results we need to characterise the 
market equilibrium, most appropriately studied using a search and matching approach. The central 
reference is Shimer and Smith (2000) laying out a model of search and assortative matching that has 
many of the features required here. More recently Lise et al (2009) have begun the process of 
solving a richer model. 
To be clear, because of the complexity of modelling such two-sided search and matching markets, 
neither of these papers directly and fully models this market, so the characterisation set out below is 
a sketch extrapolating from the richest models currently available.  
Suppose teachers differ along one dimension, possibly only imprecisely observable beforehand 
(“effectiveness”, denoted E) and that schools similarly differ in the “agreeable-ness” (A) of their 
students. This is a market with inflexible wages so wages cannot fully reflect these observable 
differences. The market will work as follows if both teachers and schools have fixed and equal 
preferences over A and E respectively, so all teachers agree on the ranking of desirable schools and 
all schools agree on the ranking of desirable teachers.  The market equilibrium will see the high E 
teachers matched with the high A schools; depending on the set-up and parameters of the model 
they may continue job search, but at a low intensity. The lower E teachers will tend to be matched 
with lower A schools, and will engage in higher intensity job search. If there is sufficient exogenous 
turnover in the model to create new job slots, and if pre-hire estimates of A and E are sufficiently 
poor to give low E teachers a chance at a better A school, then this set-up will yield the prediction of 
greater quits out of (and hires into) low A schools. So low E teachers accept jobs in low A schools and 
continue job search, simply because it is better than searching whilst unemployed, intending and 
expecting to stay there not very long. The extent of differential separations out of high and low A 
schools is likely to depend on the precision of pre-hire measures of A and E, the degree of flexibility 
of wages and on the degree of exogenous turnover.  
It is hard to argue that teachers would quit disadvantaged schools because the degree of 
disadvantage was a surprise. However, it could be that some novice teaches are surprised by how 
hard it is to deal with the challenges arising in disadvantaged schools. It could be that their 
preferences over A change, or it could be that it was an optimal strategy for them to accept the job 
temporarily and continue employed job search. 
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A number of things follow from this interpretation. First, a high level of disadvantage at a school 
gives rise to higher separation rates only indirectly, as it means that teachers will continue with job 
search and thus be more likely to leave. Second, any performance penalty that such schools suffer 
will derive from the fact that they are only able to hire relatively ineffective teachers6, as well as any 
further detrimental effect from the turnover of teachers per se. Thirdly, there are likely to be further 
equilibrium effects too. The low productivity of teachers hired to low A schools will produce poor 
academic results and hence we would expect better-off families to select away from them. To a 
degree we deal with this by using measures of neighbourhood disadvantage rather than the actual 
students admitted.  
This exposition focuses on schools’ attributes and teacher effectiveness to sketch out a model of an 
equilibrium allocation of teachers to schools. While we have very rich data on schools and pupils, 
and on a number of characteristics of teachers, the available data in England does not individually 
link teachers to pupils and so (unlike Boyd et al (2011) and Loeb et al (2011)) we cannot estimate 
teacher level measures of effectiveness.  
Finally, it is worth noting that education authorities are aware of recruitment problems in some 
schools. Incentives for teachers in specific subjects are now considerable, for example “Top 
graduates are being offered up to £30,000 tax free to train to teach the key subjects”.7 Jobs in 
specific schools facing recruitment difficulties offer inducements beyond salary such as health 
insurance.8 Such schemes clearly fit within the framework we have set out above as influencing the 
marginal job acceptance decision.  
 
b. Methodology 
Our aim in this paper is to establish the nature of the relationship between teacher turnover and 
school disadvantage.  Second, we analyse what factors ‘account’ for the correlation by sequentially 
adding a series of controls for different aspects of the school and its environment to see whether 
they account for the variation. First, we add to the baseline model the structural characteristics of 
the school, such as location, size and so on; second, we include the characteristics of the pupils 
admitted to the school. Third, we add characteristics of the local teacher labour market around the 
focus school. High poverty schools tend to be in city centres and hence in thick markets generating 
                                                          
6 We also know that inexperienced teachers are less effective for their first year or two. 
7 See https://www.gov.uk/government/news/top-graduates-to-get-up-to-30k-to-train-to-teach-core-subjects 
(August 2017).  
8 These can be seen in job adverts but as the adverts are temporary, they are not available on permanent links. 
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more job offers. It may be that this explains the higher turnover rate in such schools. Finally, we 
include the characteristics of the teachers themselves. This has to be interpreted carefully given the 
discussion above. Schools hire the teachers they can, so hiring teachers with particular 
characteristics is the school’s optimal response to their circumstances, not an exogenous factor 
imposed on them. So it is the mechanism through which higher turnover arises, not the cause of the 
higher turnover itself. 
Since we do not have a strongly exogenous source of variation in disadvantage, we do not claim that 
this relationship is simply the causal impact of poverty on turnover. There are two potential sources 
of endogeneity. The reverse causation story is that high teacher turnover reduces school 
performance, leading more affluent parents to avoid that school. 
To mitigate the effect of this we use a measure of neighbourhood disadvantage around the school 
rather than the current fraction of poor students in the school. This could also be interpreted as an 
IV strategy. That is, we could use the neighbourhood poverty rate around a school as an instrument 
for the school poverty rate. While the existence of considerable school choice means that the 
neighbourhood poverty rate is likely to be affected much less by school performance than the actual 
composition of the school, we do not push this interpretation. Running the IV estimation yields very 
similar results to those presented here (results available from the authors).  
Another argument for endogeneity is the presence of correlated unobserved characteristics. A 
number of the relevant characteristics in the teacher-school match are important for that match and 
are not well measured. The rich data that we have on pupils, schools, and neighbourhoods means 
that we probably do a reasonable job of capturing school heterogeneity.   
c. Statistical Modelling 
Our framework has two components, understanding the relationship between elapsed tenure (our 
data) and completed tenure, and then between completed tenure and the separation rate. 
Our data are a sample of teachers currently employed, so we necessarily have a distribution of 
elapsed tenure: how long each teacher has been in their job so far. At an individual level, a specific 
teacher may leave the day after the survey, or stay for another ten years. However, over the data as 
a whole, there is a relationship between elapsed and completed tenure. The link is provided by 
renewal theory (see Lancaster, 1990). Suppose completed tenure, , has pdf g( with mean , then 
the pdf of elapsed tenure,, is f() = [1 – G( )/. For individuals for whom the turnover process has 
been running a long time, the pdf of remaining tenure is the same as the pdf of elapsed tenure: 
expected completed tenure is equal to two times the elapsed tenure. To be clear, all we need to 
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assume in our analysis is that elapsed tenure is a good predictor for completed tenure, we do not 
need a steady-state assumption. 
The distribution of completed job tenure is closely related to the separation rate9. In a simple case of 
a constant separation rate over tenure and in steady state, the expected length of job tenure is 
equal to one over the separation rate; for example, a constant separation rate of 10% per year gives 
an expected completed tenure of 10 years. In a more general model, the situation is more complex. 
For one individual in a job, her tenure depends only on her own separation probability. But the 
distribution of tenure in an organisation depends in general on all the tenure-specific separation 
rates and on the hiring rate (Bartholomew, 1982). In steady-state, it depends only on the separation 
rates, but out of steady-state, it depends on hiring too. It is easy to see why: if an organisation is 
growing and experiences a burst of hiring, there will temporarily be a disproportionate number of 
people with very short tenures. 
d. Institutional structure – the assignment of new teachers 
Part of the flow of new hires into schools will be accounted for by new teachers who have just 
finished their initial training. Whilst not yet fully qualified, the hiring process for such teachers is very 
similar to that for established teachers. Unlike many other countries, there is no centralised 
allocation of new teachers, and jobs and workers are matched largely as they are in any standard 
labour market. One difference is that teachers will have spent time working in their training schools, 
and this ‘extended interview’ generates private information for that particular school, affecting the 
chances of a job offer. Depending on the specific initial training route taken, this in-school teaching 
practice will be shorter or longer, but given the established findings on the unpredictability of 
teacher effectiveness (reviewed in Burgess, 2016), this private information will be valuable to 
schools.  
 
3. Data 
Our analysis combines three datasets: the first full collection of the School Workforce Census (SWC), 
the National Pupil Database (NPD) and Edubase, giving school characteristics. We categorise all 
schools as either primary or secondary using the DfE-standard approach for non-standard entry 
schools. All special schools and nursery schools are excluded from the analysis. 
                                                          
9 In a longer version of this paper, Allen et al (2012), we use the cross-section to estimate separation rates. The 
results of that exercise are qualitatively the same as the analysis here.  
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a. School Workforce Census 
The School Workforce Census (SWC) is individual-role level data on all staff from local authorities, 
state-maintained schools and academies in England. The census is run by the Department for 
Education, with the first full sweep taking place on 4th November 2010. It is a statutory requirement 
on schools and local authorities (LAs) to submit the SWC return, with data being supplied from either 
schools or LAs, or a combination of the two.  In the majority of LAs, data is sourced from schools, but 
where possible, some LAs provide all or most of the data (although schools may still be asked to 
check the data). Validation of the returns is carried out by the LA, with the exception of Academies 
and City Technical Colleges (CTCs), who approve their own returns. 
The unit of observation is an individual-role, so it is possible for an individual who has, for example, 
one part-time contract as a lunchtime supervisor and another part-time contract as a classroom 
teacher to have two observations in the data. Similarly, an individual may also have two data entries 
if they are contracted as both a classroom teacher and Head of Department.  
The full SWC initially has 1,292,494 observations from 21,423 primary and secondary schools 
including information on over 400,000 teachers and 270,000 teaching assistants. The census includes 
contract information such as the start date, hours worked, annual pay and all roles an individual has 
within a school (teacher, head of department, lunch time supervisor etc.), as well as an indicator for 
whether the member of staff is employed by the local authority or the school they are working at. It 
also includes personal characteristics such as date of birth, gender and ethnicity, an indicator of 
whether a teacher has attained qualified teacher status (QTS), information on subject studied and 
the level of qualification (degree, PGCE etc.), as well as on the amount of time spent in the 
classroom teaching each subject. 
There are two data quality problems with SWC: missingness on particular variables and apparently 
missing observations. Missingness on variables is a particular problem for indicators such as subjects 
taught in the classroom (68% missing) and teacher qualifications, for example Qualified Teacher 
Status (QTS) route. Since this does not have to be back-filled for staff that already have QTS, it is 
missing for 78% of observations. Secondly, the very large variation in staff-pupil ratios across schools 
lead us to suspect that some schools have failed to submit a return for every member of staff and 
this should be borne in mind during the analysis section. However, our results still stand when 
excluding those schools that have a staff-pupil ratio of less than 0.02. 
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In order to focus on teacher turnover, we restrict our sample to classroom teachers, excluding 
anyone defined as support staff and teaching assistants10. Since most of the data on agency or 
service agreement teachers is missing, we also drop them, as well as those teachers who teach less 
than half a day (three hours per week). Then, by using worker ID, we are able to merge together 
roles into one observation per person. This leaves us with a sample of 343,547 people who identify 
themselves as a “classroom teacher”.  
Table 1 presents some descriptive statistics from this sample. Primary school teachers are on 
average younger than their secondary school counterparts. The vast majority of teachers are of 
white ethnicity and hold either a degree or higher, BEd or PGCE.  
We use the SWC to create a series of teacher and school level characteristics, and also estimate a 
school-level pay premium as the school fixed effect in a teacher pay regression that controls for 
years of tenure, gender, age (including interaction terms), ethnicity and whether part-time. In our 
analysis we simply use a binary indicator of whether the pay premium in a teacher’s school is greater 
than zero. 
b. Summarising the tenure data 
We focus on the distribution of elapsed tenure, how long a teacher has been in the job so far. Note 
that in a survey of current teachers, elapsed tenure is all that can ever be measured. We calculate 
tenure by using the date of arrival in school. The SWC guidance defines this as follows: 
“This shows when a member of staff began their current period of continuous service at their current 
school...Long term absences, whether for sickness, maternity or paternity, should not cause this date 
to change neither should factors such as spine point progression or passing the threshold.  However, 
a career break, which might be an extension of maternity leave, would be followed by a new date.   
Date of Arrival in School should be provided for all teachers and teaching assistants that started their 
current period of continuous service with the school during the previous academic year, i.e. from 1 
September 2009.  For staff that began their current period of continuous service some time ago, it 
may not be possible to accurately provide this information.  If this is the case the Department would 
prefer no date to be entered.”  
Despite the SWC guidance, there is no major problem of missingness with dates of arrival in school. 
                                                          
10 The SWC guidance from the DfE defines support staff as “those...that are not classroom based, eg 
matrons/nurses/medical staff, librarians, IT technicians, technicians, administrative officers/secretaries, 
bursars and other administration/clerical staff, premises and catering staff”; and teaching assistants as 
“those...based in the classroom for learning and pupil support, eg HLTAs, teaching assistants, special needs 
support staff, nursery officers/assistants, minority ethnic pupils support staff and bilingual assistants.” 
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However, there is an issue of heaping in the data. This is because most hires start on a specific date 
(1st September), 64 days from the Census date, so there are local peaks in the distribution at 64 days 
and multiples of 64 thereafter (i.e. 429 = 64 + 365). Therefore, with the creation of the tenure bands, 
we account for the heaping by shifting the bands by 64 days. We use the following categories as our 
dependent variables: 
• “hired 0 to 2 years” includes those teachers who have been at the school for less than or 
equal to 429 days;  
• “hired 2 to 5 years” includes those who have been at the school more than 429 days, but 
less than or equal to 1,890 days 
• “hired 5 to 10 years” includes those who have been at the school more than 1,890 days, but 
less than or equal to 3,716 days 
• “hired 10 years or more” includes those who have been at the school at least 3,716 days 
Table 2 presents summary statistics on tenure. Looking at all teachers, on average 7.5% were hired 
in the present year, and 8% of currently employed teachers were hired the previous year. Because 
this is a stock sample of currently employed teachers, we must be cautious about saying that the 
hiring rate last year was 8% because some of those hired will have left. Looking across the tenure 
categories, overall 20% of teachers have been in their current school for less than two years, and just 
over half have an elapsed tenure of less than five years. At the other end of the tenure distribution, 
nearly 20% have been in their present school for over 10 years, and in fact over 5% have stayed over 
20 years. Mean tenure is 6.7 years.  
The data show only minor gender differences in tenure, with women very slightly more heavily 
represented in the longer tenure categories. Mean tenure is 6.6 years for women and 6.8 years for 
men. There is also very little overall difference in the job tenure distribution between primary and 
secondary school teachers. There are more substantial differences by part-time status, part-time 
teachers having spent much longer in their current schools.  
Appendix Figure 1 displays the kernel density function of tenure days for teachers in primary and 
secondary schools, and clearly illustrates the heaping of the data at annual intervals.  
These are new data, and it would be useful to compare these results to previous studies. However, 
most of the existing UK studies focus on the rates at teachers leave the profession (the ‘wastage’ 
rate) rather than the separation rate. Barmby (2006) surveys 246 teachers in England and Wales to 
estimate a teacher wastage rate of 9.3% in England for the year 2000-01. He also finds that 26.8% of 
teachers in the sample were considering leaving teaching in the next 5 years. This is broadly in line 
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with Tracey et al (2008), showing that 3% of the teachers surveyed said that they expected to leave 
the profession in 3 years’ time, and 10% expected to move to a different school in the following 
year. In the UK, Dolton and van der Klaauw (1995) use the Department of Employment survey from 
1987 and find a turnover rate of 37% over 6.5 years (where turnover is defined as exits out of 
teaching i.e. wastage). In other countries, turnover rate estimates include values of 13% to 25% for 
the US (Ingersoll, 2001, Boe et al, 2008, and Harris and Adams, 2007), and 9% for Norway (Falch and 
Ronning, 2005).   
Comparing the sub-populations, Boe et al (1997) also report no real difference in turnover rates 
between phases of education, although Stuit and Smith (2009) find a higher separation rate in 
secondary schools. There is also evidence that turnover rates differ by gender (Grissmer and Kirby 
1987, Ingersoll 2001) though more recently Hutchings (2011) finds that the gender gap in those 
leaving the profession altogether has become insignificant.  There is evidence that part-time 
teachers have a higher turnover than full-time teachers (Boe et al, 2005), which is rather different 
from the results here. There is a good deal of evidence showing that young or less experienced 
teachers have a higher turnover rate than older or more experienced teachers (Loeb et al 2011; 
Kreig 2006; Zabalza 1978; Smithers and Robinson 2003, Boe et al (2007), Hanushek, Kain and Rivkin 
(2004)). At the level of the whole profession, Dolton and van der Klaauw (1995) find that the hazard 
rate of leaving teaching entirely exhibits positive duration dependence. 
c. National Pupil Database (NPD) and Edubase 
The NPD is an administrative database covering all pupils in state-maintained schools in England. 
NPD contains pupil demographics such as gender, within-year age, and ethnicity, and test score 
histories. The data also include indicators of whether English is the pupil’s mother tongue, and 
whether the pupil has special educational needs. Pupil characteristics are averaged to produce 
school-level descriptors. 
We have two potential measures of poverty. Eligibility for free school meals (FSM) is based on 
eligibility for welfare benefits and is a reasonably good indicator of poverty (see Hobbs and Vignoles, 
2007). The pupil’s home address is tagged with an index of deprivation, the Index of Deprivation 
Affecting Children Index (IDACI), which gives a good measure of neighbourhood deprivation.  
Edubase provides an administrative record for all schools, whether maintained or private, in 
England, which provides the structural characteristics of each school: region indicators (with 
additional indicators for the Inner, Outer and Fringe London pay regions); urban/rural indicators; 
school age span (highest and lowest ages of pupils); school governance type and whether it is a 
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single-sex, grammar or boarding school; the number of full-time equivalent pupils and also the 
official school capacity; nursery school presence indicator and size; and sixth form indicator and size. 
d. Geographies 
We are concerned with two key spatial constructs: the teacher labour market and the school 
catchment area.  
Our key explanatory variable is neighbourhood deprivation, and this is built up from the de facto 
school catchment area based on Lower Layer Super Output Areas (LLSOA). LLSOAs are a geographic 
hierarchy built from groups of contiguous Output Areas. They are generated to be as consistent in 
population size as possible, and typically contain from four to six Output Areas. The minimum 
population is 1000 and the mean is 1500. Since we know the postcodes of the pupils at the school, 
we can define the pupil catchment area as all the Lower Layer Super Output Areas from which pupils 
are drawn. Thus neighbourhood poverty is calculated by taking an unweighted average IDACI score 
of all the local neighbourhoods that the school draws from; this is in general all the local 
neighbourhoods. This differs from the straightforward school IDACI score which simply averages 
over the pupils which actually attend the school. We use the neighbourhood measure as this derives 
solely from where the school is situated rather than its actual admissions, and so can be considered 
as exogenous to school policies, and unobserved school and teacher characteristics. 
We assume that the local teacher labour market extends to a maximum radius of 30km around the 
teacher’s current school11. This is obviously ad hoc but is reasonable given data on average commute 
lengths (Dent and Bond, 2008, calculate the average commute to be 13km).  We take the number of 
other schools (of the same phase of education) within the radius as a measure of the density of the 
market. The search and matching approach shows that, other things equal, a thick market will 
generate more alternative job offers and thus make quitting more likely. We distinguish high, 
average and low market density12. There is a clear correlation with neighbourhood poverty: the high 
levels of market density are disproportionately in poorer areas. 
We also include indicators which capture the difference between the focus school and its 
competitors in the local labour market. These are: whether the school has a higher percentage of 
students eligible for FSM than the average in the local labour market; whether the mean competitor 
                                                          
11 We repeated all the analysis using a radius of 20km, and the results are very similar: same pattern of 
coefficients and same levels of (in)significance. 
12 For primary schools, we classify high market density as those schools which have more than 800 schools 
within 30km, and low market density as those which have less than or equal to 200 schools within 30km. 
Amongst secondary schools, high market density is classified as more than 200 schools within 30km, and low 
market density as less than or equal to 50 schools within 30km. 
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pay premium is greater than zero; and whether the mean competitor pupil growth rate is greater 
than zero.   
4. Results 1: Do disadvantaged schools experience high teacher 
turnover? 
We first describe the relationship of poverty with teacher turnover, before considering the source of 
the correlation. 
We present this information graphically, focussing on two cuts of the tenure distribution: teachers 
whose tenure is less than two years, and teachers with tenure greater than ten years. Figure 1 shows 
how the percentage of teachers with tenure less than two years varies with school poverty. As noted 
above, we are using neighbourhood IDACI to provide the measure of school disadvantage. Because 
of the overwhelming importance of age for tenure, we do this separately for three age categories: 
aged under than 30; aged from 30 to 50; and aged over 50; we also split schools into primary and 
secondary phases. The graph shows 50 quantiles of neighbourhood IDACI, with higher numbers 
indicating higher levels of poverty. Other than secondary school teachers aged less than 30, we 
observe a positive correlation between neighbourhood IDACI and the proportion of teachers with 
short tenures: schools situated in disadvantaged neighbourhoods have a higher proportion of new, 
potentially less experienced, teachers. There is not much difference in the pattern across the age 
groups, although the strongest correlation appears in teachers aged over 50. 
Given the pattern in the previous set of graphs, we might expect a negative correlation between 
neighbourhood IDACI and the proportion of teachers with tenure of more than ten years. Figure 2 
shows that while this is the case for secondary schools, it is not for primary schools. In secondary 
schools, the percentage of teachers with tenure of more than ten years is negatively correlated with 
neighbourhood IDACI. The opposite is true for primary school teachers. In other words, secondary 
schools situated in deprived neighbourhoods have a lower proportion of long-standing teachers.  
Figure 3 takes a different cut through the data and shows quantiles of the distribution of tenure. 
Each vertical slice of the graph shows the 10th, 25th, 50th and 75th percentile of tenure against the 
neighbourhood IDACI score (each slice represents 2% of schools). . The graph shows that there is 
little difference in short tenures across schools, and that there is a decline in longer tenures at 
schools in poor neighbourhoods. 
We postpone a discussion of the quantitative significance of the relationship until later. 
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5. Results 2: Analysis of the school tenure distribution 
What is it about poor schools and neighbourhoods that is associated with high turnover? The 
following set of regressions start with a very simple model, and progressively add more explanatory 
variables to see which if any characteristics ‘account’ for the correlation. We consider school 
characteristics, pupil characteristics, the nature of the local teacher labour market, and finally the 
characteristics of the teachers that the schools hired.   
In each of the following series of regressions13 we consider three dependent variables separately for 
primary schools, in Table 3, and secondary schools, in Table 4. These are the school fraction of 
teachers with tenure less than two years, the fraction with tenure greater than ten years, and mean 
elapsed tenure. These are school-level regressions, with a school as the unit of observation.  
The base regression controls for a few school characteristics14: the number of full time equivalent 
pupils, sixth form dummy and regional and urban dummies. As explained above, we also need to 
control for schools being ‘out-of-steady-state’, and to do this we include the 2007-2009 average 
growth in pupil numbers in all the regressions. The key variable of course is the neighbourhood 
poverty rate, and we include this flexibly to allow for non-linearities.  
As expected, the results largely reflect Figures 1 and 2: higher neighbourhood deprivation is 
associated with higher teacher turnover. In terms of the other (non-displayed) coefficients, the main 
finding is that in accordance with Smithers and Robinson (2003), we find that teacher turnover is 
higher in London. Our results also show that turnover is lower in larger schools. 
A primary school with a neighbourhood IDACI score in the highest bracket has 2.8 percentage points 
more teachers with short elapsed tenures, relative to a value of 17.1% in the least disadvantaged 
schools. For the most deprived secondary schools, the short tenure group is 2.3 percentage points 
higher, relative to the mean in the most affluent groups of 18.3%. The fraction of highly experienced 
teaching staff (tenure greater than 10 years) is 1 percentage point lower in primary schools (relative 
to 18.8%), and 5.5 percentage points lower in secondary schools (relative to 20.6%). Unsurprisingly, 
average tenure is also lower in the most deprived primary and secondary schools, by about a third of 
a year in primary schools and a year in secondary schools. 
                                                          
13 These are simple linear probability models for ease of interpretation, but nothing qualitatively changes when 
we use a probit model. 
14 There are other school characteristics that we cannot measure: Ingersoll (2001) reports that a 1-unit 
difference between schools in support (on a 4-unit scale) is associated with a 23% difference in the odds of a 
teacher departing, while a 1-unit difference in reported teacher influence between schools (on a 6-unit scale) 
is associated with a 26% difference in the odds of a teacher departing. 
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a. The role of pupil characteristics 
The base regression is built on by introducing school average pupil characteristics as independent 
variables. These are the proportion of pupils with special educational needs (SEN), the proportion 
with English as an additional language (EAL), the ethnic composition of the pupil body, and the 
proportion of female students15. As expected, some of these characteristics are significant. 
Consistent with Smithers and Robinson (2004), we find that turnover is higher in schools with a 
greater proportion of pupils with SEN. In secondary schools, a greater proportion of students with 
EAL is associated with higher teacher turnover. In terms of pupil ethnicity, our results support 
Ronfeldt et al (2011) in finding that schools with lower turnover generally have more white and 
Asian students. 
More importantly, we still find neighbourhood deprivation to be statistically significant. For example, 
the coefficient on the highest disadvantage group on the 0-2 years of tenure has declined from 0.028 
to 0.022 for primary schools, and remained unchanged at 0.023 for secondary schools. Thus pupil 
characteristics explain little of the relationship between neighbourhood deprivation and teacher 
turnover. Pupil characteristics explain a little more of mean elapsed tenure, about a quarter of the 
effect in primary schools and slightly less in secondary schools. The differences reflect movement 
within and between the two cuts of the distribution we focus on, novices and experienced teachers. 
b. The role of the local teacher labour market 
The characteristics of the local teacher labour market are added as independent variables, in order 
to capture thick market and competition effects. These characteristics are market density, the focus 
school’s estimated pay premium, dummies for the competitor’s estimated pay premia, %FSM and 
the growth rate in pupil numbers. The ability to generate such data is one of the big advantages of 
census data such as the SWC. Obviously, there is a great deal more that can be done using these 
local teacher labour markets, which we intend to follow up in subsequent papers. 
The focus school’s pay premium is negatively associated with turnover, as one might expect16. We 
also find that a school experiences higher turnover if the fraction of its students eligible for FSM is 
higher than its competitors in the teacher labour market. This speaks quite directly to an association 
between turnover and deprivation.  Market density is significant for the long tenure categories in the 
expected direction: primary schools with fewer competitors have 1.3 percentage points more 
                                                          
15 Again, there are other variables that would be useful to have: Ingersoll (2001) reports that a 1-unit 
difference in reported student discipline problems between two schools (on a 4-unit scale) is associated with a 
47% difference in the odds of a teacher departing. 
16 See also Dolton and van der Klaauw (1999) and Ingersoll (2011). 
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teachers with long tenures. Similarly, for secondary schools in thin markets, the long tenure group is 
2.6 percentage points higher.  
Our central focus is the neighbourhood deprivation results and they remain significant, though 
reduced from the base case and inclusion of pupil characteristics. Primary schools with a 
neighbourhood IDACI score in the highest bracket have 1.3 percentage points more teachers with 
short tenures, relative to a value of 17.1% in the least disadvantaged schools, so 7.6% higher. For the 
most deprived secondary schools, the short tenure group is 2.2 percentage points higher, relative to 
the mean in the most affluent groups of 18.3%. Similarly, the relationship between mean tenure and 
deprivation also reduces in size. 
c. The role of teacher characteristics 
Finally, teacher characteristics are added to the regressions: age, gender, gender*age interactions, 
shortage/surplus subject dummy, ethnicity and whether working full-time.  
As noted above, the interpretation of these results is different to the previous sub-sections. The 
characteristics of the incumbent workforce are not exogenous characteristics of the school, but 
reflect decisions made by the school given its circumstances. So the sorts of teachers that schools 
can hire are part of the mechanism through which the relationship between deprivation and 
turnover is mediated. 
Looking directly at the tenure categories, there is still a quantitatively marginal association between 
neighbourhood IDACI score and short tenures in primary schools, and essentially no association in 
secondary schools. Similarly, there is a small association left between deprivation and longer tenures 
in secondary schools, and actually a perversely signed effect for the poorest primary schools. 
Because we are unable to link teachers to pupils we cannot look at turnover and teacher 
effectiveness as Boyd et al (2008) do. The coefficients on deprivation for mean tenure remain 
significant once we control for teacher characteristics, though again they decline in size. In the 
primary school analysis, two of the coefficients change sign, reflecting also the change in the long-
tenure category, though remain very modest in size.  
As expected, most teacher characteristics are highly significant, and explain much of the tenure 
decision. Our results also support a U-shaped life-cycle pattern of turnover, with higher turnover for 
young and old teachers (the latter is likely to include retirements). Interestingly, we find that those 
teachers that teach shortage subjects (maths, physics, chemistry and foreign languages) have higher 
turnover rates. This result is supported in the literature (Grissmer and Kirby, 1992; Podgursky et al, 
2004; and Smithers and Robinson, 2004) and may be due to the fact that shortage subject teachers 
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receive more job offers.  We do not find consistent gender differences across all the specifications, 
as might have been expected given the simple unconditional means. Unlike Ingersoll (2001) and 
Boyd et al (2011), we find that ethnic minority teachers have a higher turnover rate.  
These results suggest that much of the correlation between neighbourhood deprivation and teacher 
turnover is mediated through teacher characteristics. In other words, deprived schools appear to 
hire younger and more ethnically diverse teachers than more affluent schools.  
d. Discussion 
The key results on novice and experienced teachers are as follows. Each value is the coefficient on 
the highest IDACI category relative to the mean value of the dependent variable for the lowest IDACI 
category: 
 -------- Primary --------  ------ Secondary ------ 
TENURE      
 Novice Experienced  Novice Experienced 
      
Base 16.38 -5.32  12.57 -26.70 
+ pupil characteristics 12.87 (0.00)  12.57 -21.36 
+ market characteristics  7.60 (3.72)  12.02 -17.48 
+ teacher characteristics 4.68 5.85  4.37 -8.25 
Derived from tables 3 and 4. Values in parentheses are not significantly different from zero at 10% 
 
The secondary school results are generally consistent across the tenure categories shown. The size 
of the association is greater for the longer tenure lengths. Controlling for school, student and 
teacher labour market factors reduces the association between school poverty and turnover, but 
does not eliminate it. Adding teacher characteristics does. The results are slightly less clear cut and 
consistent in primary schools, but the same overall picture emerges.  Once we control for basic 
teacher characteristics, there is little remaining relationship between disadvantage and turnover. 
This is because teachers hired by schools in poor communities tend to be younger and less well-
qualified, as Figure 4 illustrates. 
How should we interpret this? There are a number of possibilities. First, it could be that this is a 
desired career path for young teachers. New teachers may look for their first jobs near to where 
they trained, which implies predominantly urban and therefore on average deprived, schools. 
Alternatively it could be a desired career path deriving from younger teachers possibly having more 
idealistic preferences, and welcoming the opportunity to work in deprived schools. Under these 
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interpretations, the market equilibrium allocation reflects the desire of younger teachers to work in 
deprived schools, and the higher turnover in such schools derives from this. The alternative 
interpretation is the matching story set above in which the more effective teachers sort on average 
into the more affluent schools, and the disproportionate number of inexperienced teachers in the 
poorer urban schools reflects the fact that these are the best teachers that those schools can hire17. 
6. Conclusion 
We study teacher turnover in England. We have shown that there is a positive raw association 
between the level of disadvantage in the neighbourhood that a school serves and the turnover rate 
of its teachers, although this is not large. For example, a secondary school in the most disadvantaged 
category has 2.3 percentage points more teachers with short tenure than does a school located in 
the most affluent quartile, or 12.6% higher. This association diminishes as we control for school, 
pupil and local teacher labour market characteristics, but is not eliminated. The remaining 
association is largely accounted for by teacher characteristics, with the schools in poorer 
neighbourhoods hiring much younger teachers on average. We interpret this market equilibrium 
allocation as either deriving from the preferences of young teachers, or as reflecting the low market 
attractiveness of disadvantaged schools.   
We finally consider what our results mean for school effectiveness, and evaluate the contribution of 
differential turnover to the lower performance of schools with disadvantaged students. A simple 
framework is as follows. Consider a school with N teachers, who each teach S students. We abstract 
from growth or decline, the school remains the same size so always replaces teachers who leave. If 
the separation rate is  per year, then there are N novice teachers18 and the remaining (1 – )N are 
non-novice. The students taught by non-novice teachers each achieve a test score of g, but the 
students of novice teachers suffer an inexperience penalty of , so achieve (1 – ).g. The total test 
score in the school is N(1 – ).S.g + N.S.g(1 – ). The mean student score is g.(1 – ). The higher is 
the separation rate or the inexperience penalty, the lower the mean test score.  
Comparing two otherwise identical schools with high and low turnover, the gap in their test scores is 
equal to – g( – L), or as a fraction of the low turnover school’s mean score,  – ( – L)/(1 – L 
). We can use the results obtained here plus an estimate of  to put a rough empirical magnitude 
on this. The results show a conditional gap in short tenure teachers in secondary schools of 2 
                                                          
17 If idealistic teachers are also ineffective teachers, then these two stories are not dis-similar, but we are 
unaware of any evidence available to date that can link teacher preferences and effectiveness. 
18 Not all newly hired teachers will be teaching novices. About 40% of new hires in our data are of an age that 
makes them likely to be novices. 
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percentage points. The mean short tenure fraction in the least poor schools is 0.18. We use an 
estimate19 of  from Slater et al (2012): 0.042. Plugging these into the formula yields a gap in mean 
student test score relative to the test score in the low turnover school of 0.00085. This channel 
contributes almost nothing to the test score gaps between disadvantaged and affluent schools. Of 
course, there are likely to be costs to student progress from the disruption to their studies from new 
teachers, but differential teacher turnover does not seem likely to be able to explain much of the 
test score gap20.  
While the direct impact of turnover differences cannot explain socio-economic test score gaps, we 
know that differences in teacher effectiveness in general are very substantial (see Slater et al, 2012). 
Analysis of the operation of the teacher labour market will give us a better understanding of how 
particular teachers are matched and re-matched with particular schools. The results in this paper 
provide a contribution to this research programme.   
                                                          
19 The novice penalty relative to the mean GCSE score. 
20 This finding fits with others using other data. Ronfeldt (2011) finds that within the same school and year, 
students in grade levels that experienced 100% turnover had 4-7% of a standard deviation lower test scores in 
math and 3-7% of a standard deviation lower in English Language Arts (ELA) as compared to grade levels with 
no turnover at all. Reducing teacher attrition rates from one-quarter of teachers leaving to none corresponds 
to an increase in student math achievement of about 2% of a standard deviation. Dolton and Newson (2003) 
find that increasing teacher turnover by 10% leads to SATS scores declining by 2% for English and 2.5% for 
Maths. 
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Figure 1: % Tenure 0-2 years  
 
Figure 2: % Tenure 10+ years 
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Figure 3: Elapsed tenure by neighbourhood IDACI 
 
Figure 4: Teacher characteristics and school disadvantage 
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Tables 
 
Table 1: Teacher numbers and characteristics 
 
Note: Classroom teachers only 
  
  ---Primary---  ---Secondary--
- 
Gender     
Male    11.1  35.9 
Female  88.9  64.1 
Age category     
Age <= 30  28.9  29.1 
30 < Age <= 50  51.7  51.0 
Age > 50   19.4  19.9 
Highest Qualification     
Degree or higher  62.6  78.2 
BEd  21.4  7.4 
PGCE  2.8  3.4 
Other qualification  6.1  3.2 
Ethnicity     
Asian excl Chinese ethnicity   2.7  3.6 
Black ethnicity  1.3  2.5 
Other incl Chinese ethnicity  0.9  1.1 
White ethnicity  91.6  87.6 
N  171,410  172,137 
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Table 2: Tenure descriptive statistics 
 All teachers Male Female Primary 
Secondar
y Full-time Part-time 
Age<=30 30<age<5
0 
Age>5
0 
London Non-
London 
Average elapsed 
tenure (years) 
6.7 6.8 6.6 6.5 6.9 6.6 6.8 6.2 6.7 7.3 5.8 6.9 
Tenure distribution 
(%) 
            
0-2 years 19.4 20.4 19.2 19.5 19.4 21.6 12.4 37.9 14.1 6.3 23.5 18.7 
 Of which hired this 
year 
7.5 7.9 7.4 7.7 7.3 8.6 4.2 15.6 5.2 1.8 9.1 7.3 
2-5 years 36.8 37.0 36.7 36.6 37.0 38.7 30.7 51.6 35.7 18.0 38.7 36.5 
5-10 years 24.8 23.5 25.2 24.8 24.8 22.7 31.5 10.4 32.6 25.6 23.0 25.2 
10 years or more 18.9 19.1 18.9 19.1 18.8 16.9 25.4 0.0 17.7 50.1 14.9 19.7 
N 343,547 80,704 262,843 172,137 171,410 262,020 81,527 99,564 176,457 67,526 53,434 290,113 
Note: Classroom teachers 
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Table 3: Regression analysis of poverty and teacher turnover – Primary schools 
 
0.15 < Neighbourhood IDACI 
<= 0.2 
0.2 < Neighbourhood IDACI 
<= 0.3 
Neighbourhood IDACI > 0.3 
 
 Beta SE Beta SE Beta SE R-squared 
TENURE 0-2 YEARS:       
 
Base case 0.010**        0.004 0.033*** 0.004 0.028*** 0.004 0.083 
With pupil characteristics 0.010**        0.004 0.031*** 0.004 0.022*** 0.004 0.085 
With pupil and market characteristics 0.007*        0.004 0.024*** 0.005 0.013*** 0.005 0.087 
With pupil, market and teacher characteristics 0.001 0.004 0.011*** 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.243 
TENURE 10+ YEARS:        
Base case -0.001 0.004 -0.016*** 0.004 -0.010** 0.004 0.176 
With pupil characteristics 0 0.004 -0.012*** 0.004 0 0.004 0.181 
With pupil and market characteristics 0.001 0.004 -0.007* 0.004 0.007 0.005 0.192 
With pupil, market and teacher characteristics 0.008** 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.013*** 0.004 0.374 
AVERAGE ELAPSED TENURE: 
       
Base case -0.084 0.070 -0.357*** 0.070 -0.329** 0.068 0.175 
With pupil characteristics -0.065 0.070 -0.287*** 0.070 -0.147** 0.072 0.181 
With pupil and market characteristics -0.029 0.070 -0.181** 0.072 0.005 0.076 0.191 
With pupil, market and teacher characteristics 0.109* 0.059 0.041 0.060 0.154** 0.063 0.451 
Notes:  Unit of observation is a school. The first two regressions in each set have 16,268 observations; the other regressions have 16,267 observations.  
Each row is a regression, only reporting the coefficients on the IDACI variables relative to the omitted category of low IDACI (IDACI <= 0.15).  
Dependent variables are: the proportion of teachers with tenure 0-2 years, the proportion of teachers 10+ years; average elapsed tenure.  
             * indicates significant at 10%, ** indicates significant at 5%, *** indicates significant at 1% 
             Variables included in all regressions are: pupil growth rate, school size dummies, sixth form, inner/outer London pay regions, local authority and urban dummies 
             Pupil characteristics are: ethnicity, proportion of female students, SEN status and EAL status 
             Market characteristics included: school pay premium, market density dummies, and competitor pay premium, pupil growth rate and %FSM dummies 
             Teacher characteristics are: age, gender, age/gender interaction terms, ethnicity, full-time/part-time dummy and shortage/surplus subject dummy  
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Table 4: Regression analysis of poverty and teacher turnover – Secondary schools 
 
0.15 < Neighbourhood IDACI 
<= 0.2 
0.2 < Neighbourhood IDACI 
<= 0.3 
Neighbourhood IDACI > 0.3 
 
 Beta SE Beta SE Beta SE R-squared 
TENURE 0-2 YEARS:       
 
Base case 0 0.005 0.018*** 0.006 0.023*** 0.007 0.187 
With pupil characteristics 0.001 0.006 0.018*** 0.006 0.023*** 0.007 0.189 
With pupil and market characteristics 0.001 0.006 0.018*** 0.006 0.022*** 0.007 0.192 
With pupil, market and teacher characteristics -0.006 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.007 0.340 
TENURE 10+ YEARS:        
Base case -0.016*** 0.005 -0.035*** 0.006 -0.055*** 0.007 0.321 
With pupil characteristics -0.014*** 0.005 -0.030*** 0.006 -0.044*** 0.007 0.332 
With pupil and market characteristics -0.013** 0.005 -0.027*** 0.006 -0.036*** 0.007 0.336 
With pupil, market and teacher characteristics -0.003 0.004 -0.009* 0.005 -0.016*** 0.006 0.540 
AVERAGE ELAPSED TENURE:        
Base case -0.320*** 0.102 -0.662*** 0.110 -1.032*** 0.133 0.286 
With pupil characteristics -0.285*** 0.102 -0.573*** 0.113 -0.842** 0.145 0.295 
With pupil and market characteristics -0.274*** 0.102 -0.508*** 0.116 -0.707*** 0.151 0.298 
With pupil, market and teacher characteristics -0.059 0.080 -0.144 0.090 -0.283** 0.118 0.575 
Notes:  Unit of observation is a school. The first two regressions in each set have 2,770 observations; the other regressions have 2,769 observations.  
Each row is a regression, only reporting the coefficients on the IDACI variables relative to the omitted category of low IDACI (IDACI <= 0.15).  
Dependent variables are: the proportion of teachers with tenure 0-2 years, the proportion of teachers 10+ years; average elapsed tenure.  
             * indicates significant at 10%, ** indicates significant at 5%, *** indicates significant at 1% 
             Variables included in all regressions are: pupil growth rate, school size dummies, sixth form, inner/outer London pay regions, local authority and urban dummies 
             Pupil characteristics are: ethnicity, proportion of female students, SEN status and EAL status 
             Market characteristics included: school pay premium, market density dummies, and competitor pay premium, pupil growth rate and %FSM dummies 
             Teacher characteristics are: age, gender, age/gender interaction terms, ethnicity, full-time/part-time dummy and shortage/surplus subject dummy 
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Appendix Figures  
 
Appendix Figure 1: Kernel density function 
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